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COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN 
MEXICO: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 
UMUT AYDIN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Mexico adopted its first competition law, the Federal Law on Economic 
Competition (Ley Federal de Competencia Económica (FLEC)) in 1992,1 in 
preparation for the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) which required the three signatory states to have national competition 
laws.2 A comprehensive legislation on competition that included prohibitions 
against cartels, abuses of dominance, and that required merger review, as well as 
an agency to implement these laws, was a new phenomenon for Mexico. As is 
frequently the case with legal transplants, at the time, few domestic actors knew 
what competition law meant and what impact, if any, it would have on them. For 
the Federal Commission of Competition (Comisión Federal de Competencia 
(FCC)), the early years were a period of trial and error, and the experience 
proved taxing. Government and private actors criticized the FCC for being weak, 
court proceedings triggered by companies’ complaints slowed down 
investigations,3 and a number of the FCC’s decisions were reversed by the district 
courts on procedural grounds.4 
Fast forward to 2015, and the competition policy scene has changed 
dramatically in Mexico. Mexican competition law and policy have become more 
effective thanks to a series of legislative reforms starting in 2006. Reforms in 
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1. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de
la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.). 
2. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.–Can.–Mex., art. 1501, ¶ 1, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993). 
3.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], REGULATORY REFORM IN MEXICO: THE 
ROLE OF COMPETITION POLICY IN REGULATORY REFORM 8 (1998) [hereinafter OECD 1998]. 
4.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN
MEXICO: AN OECD PEER REVIEW 45 (2004) [hereinafter OECD 2004].  
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20065 and 20116 increased the investigative powers of the FCC by introducing a 
leniency program, the power to conduct dawn raids, and higher maximum fines 
for competition infringements. After a constitutional amendment in 2013, the 
FCC was reconstituted as an autonomous body, renamed the Federal 
Commission of Economic Competition (Comisión Federal de Competencia 
Económica (COFECE)).7 The 2013 reforms also established specialized antitrust 
courts, and the Federal Institute for Telecommunications (Instituto Federal de 
Telecomunicaciones (IFETEL)), an independent regulator responsible for 
enforcing competition law in the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors.8 
In 2014, the Mexican Congress passed a new competition law, further increasing 
the COFECE’s powers.9 The Mexican competition regime has also become more 
effective as a result of a gradual learning process by the FCC and later the 
COFECE. Over time, the agencies have improved the legal reasoning and the 
economic analysis in their investigations and decisions, and have become more 
transparent and better able to communicate with political, economic, and societal 
actors. 
Thanks to these developments, the COFECE has become a well-respected 
enforcement agency, ranking above some Western European competition 
agencies with longer histories and much greater resources in the Global 
Competition Review’s annual rankings.10 Mexico has also climbed from a low of 
116th place in 2010 to 67th in “effectiveness of anti-monopoly policy” according 
to the World Economic Forum’s competitiveness index in 2015.11 The COFECE 
participates actively in international forums such as the International 
Competition Network (ICN) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
  
  
 
 5.  Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan, y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal 
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 
28-6-2006 (Mex.). 
 6.  Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal 
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], del Código Penal Federal y del Código 
Fiscal de la Federación, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 10-5-2011 (Mex.). 
 7.  Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan diversas disposiciones de los artículos 6o., 7o., 27, 
28, 73, 78, 94 y 105 de la Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, en materia de 
telecomunicaciones, art. 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 11-6-2013 (Mex.). 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Decreto por el que se expide la Ley Federal de Competencia Económica y se reforman y 
adicionan diversos artículos del Código Penal Federal, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 23 Mayo de 
2014 (Mex.); GLOB. COMPETITION REV., Mexico’s Federal Competition Commission, in RATING 
ENFORCEMENT 2015 (2015) [hereinafter GCR 2015]. 
 10.  See GLOB. COMPETITION REV., RATING ENFORCEMENT 2015: STAR RATINGS (2015) 
[hereinafter GCR 2015 STAR RATINGS].  
 11.  The Global Competitiveness Index Historical Dataset 2005–2016 (XLS), WORLD ECON. F. 
(Effectiveness of Anti-Monopoly Policy, code 6.03), http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-
report-2015-2016 [https://perma.cc/9MX9-F7FC; https://perma.cc/S5WP-V54F]. 
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and Development (OECD),12 and is held up in the Latin American and 
Caribbean region as a model.13 
This article explores the factors that have contributed to the transformation 
of the Mexican competition regime from a relatively ineffective one in a highly 
concentrated economy to a relative success story. The gradual strengthening of 
competition law in Mexico is fascinating because political, economic, and social 
conditions tip the scales in the opposite direction: a history of high state 
involvement in the economy,14 high economic concentration,15 well-organized 
business interests,16 weak regulatory institutions,17 and a general lack of trust in 
market mechanisms18 make Mexico an unlikely case for success. An agency 
relatively well endowed with financial and human resources in an upper-middle-
income country, the FCC/COFECE have also had advantages compared to 
agencies in poorer countries. However, national income or agency resources do 
not completely explain the trajectory of the Mexican competition regime: An 
agency with sufficient resources could still be ineffective.19 The analysis presented 
here goes beyond a focus on resources and emphasizes instead the politics, both 
domestic and international, of agency effectiveness. 
The gradual strengthening of the Mexican competition regime can be 
explained by the interplay of domestic and international political factors. 
Domestically, a constituency in favor of better competition policy enforcement 
composed of consumers and consumer organizations, think tanks and business 
associations, firms traditionally excluded from markets, and lawyers and the bar 
association gradually emerged and gained a voice in Mexico. This domestic 
constituency has been crucial for the reforms in two ways. First, these domestic 
 
 12.  See comments by Michael D. Blechman, Omar Guerrero Rodriguez, & Ali Haddou, Panel 
Discussion: Antitrust developments in India and Mexico, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM 
COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 409, 433–34 (Barry E. 
Hawk ed., 2013).  
 13.  Claudia Schatan & Eugenio Rivera, Markets in Central America and Mexico: What is Happening 
with Competition?, in COMPETITION POLICIES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 7, 8 (Eugenio Rivera and 
Claudia Schatan eds., 2008); not for attribution interviews conducted by the author, Washington, D.C. 
(Mar. 25, 2015) and Chicago (Apr. 17, 2015).  
 14.  Judith A. Teichman, The Evolution of Public Enterprise in Mexico, in PRIVATIZATION AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE IN MEXICO 26, 26 (1995).  
 15.  Alex E. Fernández Jilberto & Barbara Hogenboom, Latin American Conglomerates in the 
Neoliberal Era: The Politics of Economic Concentration in Chile and Mexico, in BIG BUSINESS AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: CONGLOMERATES AND ECONOMIC GROUPS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
AND TRANSITION ECONOMIES UNDER GLOBALISATION 135, 136–37 (Alex E. Fernández Jilberto & 
Barbara Hogenboom eds., 2007).  
 16.  Ben Ross Schneider, Why Is Mexican Business So Organized?, 37 LATIN AM. RES. REV. 77, 78 
(2002).  
 17.  WORLD BANK, REPORT NO. 37293-MX, DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE IN MEXICO: BEYOND 
STATE CAPTURE AND SOCIAL POLARIZATION 40 (2007); Jacint Jordana, Autonomous Regulatory 
Agencies in Democratic Mexico, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM. 753, 756 (2010). 
 18.  OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 12.  
 19.  See generally Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: 
Explaining Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 
4, 2016 (discussing resource constraints as only one of many obstacles).  
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actors initiate complaints before the FCC/COFECE, participate in class actions, 
and demand more transparency and accountability from the FCC/COFECE, thus 
contributing to strengthening the enforcement of competition law in Mexico. The 
pro-competition domestic constituency has also indirectly influenced legislative 
reforms by electorally supporting politicians advocating reforms. 
The impact of this domestic constituency is reinforced by international 
factors, such as pressures from foreign firms trying to break into the Mexican 
market, as well as support and pressure from international organizations, in 
particular the OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
the ICN. The recommendations of international organizations were influential in 
shaping the legislative reforms as well as the gradual improvements in the FCC’s 
performance. These organizations have also helped steer political support for the 
FCC in its negotiations with domestic political actors. International actors have 
reinforced the domestic pro-competition constituency by cooperating with and 
providing support to think tanks and non-governmental organizations. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows: Part II explains what is meant 
by effectiveness of competition law and policy, and describes the changes in the 
effectiveness of the Mexican regime over time. Part III presents a brief overview 
of the process that led to the adoption of the first competition law in Mexico in 
1992. Part IV reviews the provisions of the law and the organizational makeup of 
the FCC. Part V discusses the obstacles that the FCC faced in its early years in 
implementing the Mexican competition law. Part VI explains how reforms have 
addressed those obstacles, and Part VII discusses the factors that made these 
reforms possible. Part VIII concludes. 
II 
DEFINING EFFECTIVENESS OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 
In defining the “effectiveness” or “success” of competition law and policy, 
this article focuses on the extent to which a country’s competition regime 
advances the various goals attributed to competition law and policy in developing 
countries, as discussed in the introductory article to this symposium.20 Rather 
than relying on a quantitative metric of effectiveness, though one is offered, this 
article  aims to qualitatively assess how reforms to the competition regime in 
Mexico have contributed to advancing these goals. 
Effectiveness of a competition regime is sometimes measured by the regime’s 
impact on indicators such as aggregate economic growth, inward foreign 
investment flows, democracy, or corruption; however, it is difficult to link these 
outcomes directly to the operation of a competition regime in a country.21 Other 
typical metrics employed to measure effectiveness of competition laws in 
quantitative studies such as the World Economic Forum’s “effectiveness of 
antimonopoly law” or “intensity of local competition” are not very helpful 
 
 20.  Id. at 4–14.  
 21.  See generally id.  
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either.22 These indicators are based on surveys that might be measuring 
respondents’ general perceptions of the economy and not specifically the 
effectiveness of competition regimes.23 Moreover, because these data only go 
back to 2006—the year that reforms to the Mexican competition regime started—
they do not allow for a before and after comparison of the effectiveness of 
competition law and policy in Mexico. 
Global Competition Review’s annual rating of enforcement agencies is more 
helpful, because the rankings are based on an in-depth evaluation of both the 
legislation and the annual enforcement performance of agencies.24 The rating—
ranging from two stars to five, from the least to the most successful—is useful as 
a measure of how international and national experts evaluate the overall 
performance of a competition agency, and is accompanied by a narrative 
explaining the reasons behind the score. Competition agencies included in the 
annual rating care deeply about it, and many, including the COFECE, use this as 
one of the benchmarks of their performance in their annual reports.25 In Global 
Competition Review’s rating, Mexico has climbed from two stars in 2002, the first 
year it was included in the ratings,26 to three stars since 2014, a ranking it shares 
with competition agencies of Austria, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden among 
others, and above those of Belgium, Denmark, and Ireland.27 
While useful as a summary measure, Global Competition Review’s rating by 
itself is not very informative about the various dimensions of effectiveness that 
are introduced in this symposium. This article draws on the framework offered in 
the introductory article to the symposium to offer a more nuanced evaluation of 
effectiveness. It focuses on the extent to which the competition regime of a 
country advances the goals attributed to competition law and policy in 
developing countries: increasing economic efficiency, contributing to economic 
and human development, unleashing rivalry in the private sector and vis-à-vis the 
state, fostering a competition culture, and advancing economic and political 
freedom.28 These goals not only reflect the debate in the literature on competition 
law and policy in developing countries, but also have a significant overlap with 
the objectives of competition policy defined by the Mexican competition law 
 
 22.  See WORLD ECON. F., supra note 11.  
 23.  On cognitive problems and systematic biases in surveys, see generally Marianne Bertrand & 
Sendhil Mullainathan, Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective Survey Data, 91 AM. 
ECON. REV. 67 (2001); Benjamin A. Olken, Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality, 93 J. PUB. 
ECON. 950, 951 (2009) (finding biases in perceptions of corruption in a survey of Indonesian villagers 
regarding a road-building project).  
 24.  On this point, see Serdar Dalkir, A Quantitative Evaluation of Effectiveness and Efficacy of 
Competition Policies across Countries, in 2 POLITICS TRUMPS ECONOMICS: POLITICAL ECONOMY AND 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF COMPETITION LAW AND REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 226, 
231 n.85 (Pradeep S. Mehta & Simon J. Evenett eds., 2009) (citing Eleanor Fox). 
 25.  Not for attribution interviews conducted by the author, Paris, Fr. (July 7, 2015).  
 26.  GLOB. COMPETITION REV., RATING ENFORCEMENT 2002 11 (2002) [hereinafter GCR 2002].  
 27.  GCR 2015 STAR RATINGS, supra note 10.  
 28.  Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 4–14. 
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(economic efficiency)29 and the COFECE in its first strategic plan covering the 
period 2014 through 2017 (advancing economic development, advocacy vis-à-vis 
the state, and fostering a competition culture).30 A brief qualitative assessment of 
how reforms to the Mexican competition regime have advanced effectiveness in 
terms of each of these goals follows. 
A. Maximizing Efficiency 
Efficiency maximization as a goal of competition policy signifies focusing on 
enforcement against anti-competitive practices that are most likely to cause 
efficiency losses, such as cartels.31 Cartel enforcement, which suffered in the 
initial years of the FCC’s life,32 has become a priority with the introduction of a 
leniency program in 2006, the ability to conduct dawn raids and to impose 
criminal sanctions in 2011, and increases in maximum fines in 2011 and 2014. 
These reforms have had tangible results: a growing number of cartels are being 
investigated and higher fines have been imposed.33 
B. Contributing To Economic And Human Development 
Competition agencies in developing countries may contribute to economic 
and human development in various ways, notably by focusing enforcement 
efforts on sectors that have a direct impact on the well-being of the poor, as well 
as aiming to increase market participation from previously excluded segments of 
the population.34 While the FCC long realized the importance of targeting 
enforcement at areas that could have a direct impact on the poor—as evidenced 
by its early efforts to address anti-competitive activities in staple food products 
such as tortillas35—after the 2014 reforms, this has become one of the priorities 
 
 29.  Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 2o, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SECTION OF 
ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW ON THE 
COMPETITION DIMENSION OF NAFTA 48 (1994). 
 30.  COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICO, PLAN ESTRATÉGICO 2014–2017 18–21 
(2015). 
 31.  Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 6. 
 32.  Gabriel Castañedo, Mexico’s Competition Regime: Walking the Walk, Slowly, 6 COMPETITION 
L. INT’L 37, 39 (2010). 
 33.  Author’s calculations from statistics in Rating Enforcement: Federal Competition Commission 
of Mexico, GLOB. COMPETITION REVIEW (2004–2015), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/ 
surveys/archive [https://perma.cc/V6D2-NQUP]. In the early and mid-2000s, cartel fines averaged under 
a million euros, whereas after 2008, average fines in most years were over a million euros. While data are 
not clear cut in terms of number of cartel investigations and decisions, after 2008, there has been a steady 
stream of leniency applications, dawn raids, and decisions that resulted in fines.  
 34.  Aditya Bhattacharjea, Who Needs Antitrust? Or, Is Developing-Country Antitrust Different? A 
Historical-Comparative Analysis, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 52, 53 (Daniel D. Sokol, 
Thomas K. Cheng, & Ioannis Lianos eds., 2013); Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 7–8.  
 35.  See, e.g., COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, INFORME DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA 
2003, 15 (2003) (on CFC’s investigations on anti-competitive behavior in sectors such as milk, tortillas, 
soft drinks, among others, with impact on broad intermediate and final consumption); Fernando Sánchez 
Ugarte, Diez Años de Política de Competencia, in LA PRIMERA DÉCADA DE LA COMISIÓN FEDERAL 
DE COMPETENCIA 25, 93 (2003) (on CFC’s emphasis on absolute monopolistic practices in sectors that 
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of the COFECE.36 A market study on the agro-food sector completed at the end 
of 2015, for instance, has the goal of benefiting low-income consumers.37 
C. Unleashing Rivalry In The Private Sector 
In terms of unleashing rivalry in the private sector, the initial challenge is to 
build an agency’s analytical capacity for identifying impediments to competition 
in the private sector, followed by efforts to remedy them. Along these lines, the 
FCC conducted market studies in sectors such as finance, pharmaceuticals, buses, 
and airlines with varying degrees of success in dismantling barriers.38 Reforms in 
2011 and 2014 increased the FCC/COFECE’s capacity by formally granting it the 
power to conduct market studies.39 The COFECE cannot take direct measures in 
the markets based on the conclusions of market studies; however, it can use these 
as a basis for advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the public and private sectors. Its newly 
acquired power to conduct market studies gives the COFECE a sound basis for 
unleashing rivalry in the private sector. 
D. Unleashing Rivalry Vis-à-Vis The State 
Closely related is the goal of unleashing rivalry vis-à-vis the state. The FCC 
has had an important advocacy role vis-à-vis the state since its establishment, with 
the power to issue non-binding opinions on existing legislation, and upon the 
invitation of the executive branch, on new legislation. Some of its early advocacy 
efforts were criticized for not being effective, such as for failing to prevent the 
government’s nationalization of various sugar factories in 2001,40 but they have 
gradually begun to have tangible impacts, such as in the reform of the pension 
system as well as in the privatization of national airlines and the entry of low-cost 
airlines in the market.41 The 2006 reform allowed the FCC to give binding 
 
influence low-income consumers).  
 36.  COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICO, supra note 30, at 23 tbl.2.  
 37.  See COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA, REPORTE SOBRE LAS CONDICIONES 
DE COMPETENCIA EN EL SECTOR AGROALIMENTARIO  9 (2015) (describing the importance of the agro-
food sector for consumers, especially in low-income sectors of society, as a motivation for the market 
study). 
 38.  For reports resulting from these market studies, see COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA & 
ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., RECOMENDACIONES PARA PROMOVER UN MARCO 
REGULATORIO MÁS FAVORABLE A LA COMPETENCIA EN EL MERCADO FARMACÉUTICO (2009); 
COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA & ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., REGULACIÓN Y 
COMPETENCIA EN EL AUTOTRANSPORTE FORÁNEO DE PASAJEROS (2009); AGUSTIN J. ROS, A 
COMPETITION POLICY ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC AIRLINE SECTOR IN MEXICO AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE COMPETITION (2010). See generally Juan Manuel Espino, México, in 
PROMOTING MARKET STUDIES IN LATIN AMERICA, Conference organized by United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 18–19 Mar. 2015, Santiago, Chile, 9 (2015) 
(describing the evolution of the legal framework for market studies in Mexican competition law, and the 
outcomes of some of the market studies). 
 39.  Id. at 6. 
 40.  Gabriel Castañedo Gallardo, Orígenes, Avances y Dificultades de la Política de Competencia en 
México (1993–2004), in 3 EL NUEVO MILENIO MEXICANO: EL CAMBIO ESTRUCTURAL 337, 369 
(Pascual García Alba Iduñate, Lucino Gutiérrez Herrera, & Gabriela Torres Ramírez eds., 2004). 
 41.  Jorge L. Velázquez Roa, Competition Policy and Regulatory Reform in Mexico, 4 INT’L J. PUB. 
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opinions on federal programs and policies—though its opinion can still be vetoed 
by the President of the Republic.42 
E. Fostering A Competition Culture 
Progress in the FCC’s advocacy efforts aimed at fostering a competition 
culture among economic actors and the public at large has been the result of a 
gradual learning process, rather than due to legislative reforms. Early on, the 
FCC was criticized for not devoting sufficient attention to its communication with 
the public.43 However, it has been able to turn this around not only by focusing 
enforcement on cases with significant impact on consumers, but also by devoting 
resources to communicating the benefits of its activities more effectively to the 
public.44 As a consequence of their advocacy activities, the FCC and the 
COFECE have increased references to competition law and policy on the public 
agenda.45 Awareness of competition law among businesses has grown, and many 
more law and economic consultancy firms specializing in competition have 
sprung.46 
F. Advancing Political And Economic Freedom 
The Mexican competition regime has arguably made only a modest 
contribution to advancing political and economic freedom in the country, and 
improvements in this area have been slow. One way a competition regime can 
help advance economic freedom in a country is by tackling economic 
concentration in national markets. Initially the FCC had few tools to address 
existing monopolies.47 In 2006, the FCC was granted the power to restructure 
monopolies; however, progress on this front has been meager, with few large 
firms effectively dominating national markets in sectors such as 
telecommunications, beer, cement, and broadcasting.48 Dominant firms in the 
media sector are particularly problematic for political freedom, as these firms 
 
  
 
POL’Y 100, 106 (2009). 
 42.  Decreto por el que se reforman, adicionan, y derogan diversas disposiciones de la Ley Federal 
de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 24, pfo. 6, Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] 28-6-2006 (Mex.). 
 43.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 29; Julius Cavendish, Among the Oligopolists, GLOB. 
COMPETITION REV. (Feb. 1, 2007), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/1215/among-
oligopolists/ [https://perma.cc/SG5V-9GAZ].  
 44.  Angel López Hoher, Competition Advocacy in Mexico: Lessons from the Past Decade, 8 CPI 
ANTITRUST CHRON., no. 2, 2012, at 2, 3. 
 45.  Id. at 3–4. 
 46.  Julius Cavendish, Tequila Sunrise, GLOB. COMPETITION REV (Feb. 1, 2007), 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/features/article/1216/tequila-sunrise/ [https://perma.cc/8QTP-
ASFJ].  
 47.  OECD 1998, supra note 3 at 12–13.  
 48.  Busting the Cartels: Mexico’s Competition Policy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 4, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/15610165 [https://perma.cc/4TT7-F7KH].  
AYDIN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2016  1:47 PM 
No. 4 2016] COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN MEXICO 163 
may—and have been known to—control access to political campaigning in 
Mexico.49 
To summarize, Mexican competition law and policy cannot be characterized 
as an unqualified success with respect to all the objectives that are attributed to 
competition law and policy in developing countries. Legislative and 
constitutional reforms, as well as gradual institutional learning, improved the 
effectiveness of the system on many fronts, but on others such as advancing 
political and economic freedom, progress has been meager. The trajectory of the 
Mexican competition regime resembles a gradual upward slope among the 
trajectories of competition regimes identified by Kovacic and Lopez-Galdos in 
this symposium.50 
III 
MEXICO’S ROCKY ROAD TO THE FEDERAL LAW ON ECONOMIC 
COMPETITION IN 1992 
After nearly fifty years of developmental policies aimed at protecting and 
fostering its domestic market, in the 1980s Mexico embarked on a route towards 
free trade and domestic liberalization following the debt crisis of 1982.51 High 
inflation and a sharp fall in real wages—over seven percent, on average, annually 
from 1983 through 198852—led the Mexican government under President Miguel 
de la Madrid (1982 through 1988) to embark on an ambitious program of 
economic reforms, which continued to deepen under the presidency of Carlos 
Salinas (1988 through 1994).53 The first phase of Mexican reforms focused mostly 
on structural adjustment. The administration slashed the government budget, 
radically devalued the peso, eliminated subsidies, and reduced public employees’ 
wages.54 By the mid-1980s, it launched deeper institutional reforms such as 
privatization, deregulation and regulatory reform, and trade liberalization. 
Mexico entered the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1986.55 In 1991, 
the Mexican administration announced that it would start negotiations with the 
United States and Canada for NAFTA.56 The negotiations started in 1991 and 
were concluded in 1993, and the agreement came into force in 1994.57 
This is the context in which the first modern Mexican competition law was 
 
 49.  Gustavo Flores-Macías, Mexico’s 2012 Elections: The Return of the PRI, 24 J. DEMOCRACY 128, 
136 (2013). 
 50.  William E. Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, Lifecycles of Competition Systems: Explaining 
Variation in the Implementation of New Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4., 2016, at 116–17. 
 51.  NORA LUSTIG, MEXICO: THE REMAKING OF AN ECONOMY 28 (1998). 
 52.  Nora Lustig, The 1982 Debt Crisis, Chiapas, NAFTA, and Mexico’s Poor, CHALLENGE, Mar.–
Apr. 1995, at 45, 46. 
 53.  LUSTIG, supra note 51, at 29.  
 54.  SARAH BABB, MANAGING MEXICO: ECONOMISTS FROM NATIONALISM TO NEOLIBERALISM 
179 (2001). 
 55.  Id. at 181. 
 56.  FREDERICK W. MAYER, INTERPRETING NAFTA: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF POLITICAL 
ANALYSIS 49–50 (1998). 
 57.  MAXWELL A. CAMERON & BRIAN W. TOMLIN, THE MAKING OF NAFTA xi-xiv (2000). 
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adopted in December of 1992.58 The history of competition legislation in Mexico 
goes back to the prohibition of monopolies in the constitution of 1857.59 The 
Mexican Constitution of 1917 likewise included a ban on monopolies in addition 
to provisions against cartels and abuses of dominance, but these provisions were 
not enforced due to the absence of implementing regulations.60 The 1934 Organic 
Law of Monopolies was likewise ineffective.61 In practice, until the end of the 
1980s, many businesses were shielded from competition through the chambers of 
commerce, industry, or by some level of government.62 The degree of economic 
concentration in the economy was high. In 1992, twenty-five companies 
accounted for 47.1% of Mexican GDP.63 
A number of officials from the Economic Deregulation Unit at the Secretary 
of Commerce and Industrial Development became convinced of the necessity of 
adopting a competition law during the broad institutional reform agenda of the 
1980s.64 These officials perceived competition law as an antidote to collusion 
among large firms, as a counterweight to state-owned monopolies, and as a 
defense of consumers and firms in the regulated sectors of the economy in which 
regulators had become unduly close to regulated interests.65 The expectation was 
that the law would not only promote competition in the marketplace, but could 
also reduce state intervention in the economy. 
In the meantime, progress in negotiations with the United States and Canada 
gave an external impetus for the adoption of a competition law, as NAFTA 
committed the signing parties to the adoption of national measures proscribing 
anti-competitive business conduct.66 The biggest objections to the law came from 
different parts of the government,67 but the level of interest and support from the 
public and the business community was also low.68 Potential opposition from 
business was muted by the fact that business associations were supportive of 
NAFTA in general.69 Likewise, businesses were much more preoccupied with 
negotiations about tariffs and quotas than they were focused on competition 
 
 58. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.). 
 59.  Omar Guerrero Rodriguez & Alan Ramírez, Pursuit of Effective Antitrust Enforcement: 
Mexico’s Case, in ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORDHAM COMPETITION LAW INSTITUTE: 
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW AND POLICY 387, 389 (Barry E. Hawk ed., 2013). 
 60.  Rafael del Villar & Javier Soto Alvarez, Logros y dificultades de la Politica de Competencia 
Económica en México, 821 INFORMACIÓN COMERCIAL ESPAÑOLA 107, 108 (2005). 
 61.  Joshua A. Newberg, Mexico’s New Economic Competition Law: Toward the Development of a 
Mexican Law of Antitrust, 31 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 587, 587 (1993). 
 62.  Marcos Avalos, Condiciones Generales de Competencia: El Caso de Mexico, 48 CEPAL SERIE 
ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS 1, 10 (2006).  
 63.  Newberg, supra note 61, at 603. 
 64.  Avalos, supra note 62, at 10.  
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Gabriel Castañeda Gallardo, Antitrust Enforcement in Mexico 1993–1995 and its Prospects, 4 
U.S.–MEX. L.J. 19, 21 n.8 (1996).  
 67.  Avalos, supra note 62, at 11.  
 68.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 5; Castañeda Gallardo, supra note 40, at 344. 
 69.  Schneider, supra note 16, at 102.  
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law.70 The process resulted in the adoption of the FLEC in December 1992, and 
the establishment of the FCC in June 1993. 
IV 
THE FEDERAL LAW ON ECONOMIC COMPETITION (1992) 
The FLEC71 includes provisions against cartels and abuses of dominant 
positions, and allows for merger review and competition advocacy. The FLEC 
classifies potentially anti-competitive practices as either absolute or relative. 
Absolute monopolistic practices are what are referred to in most other 
jurisdictions as “hard-core cartels,” or agreements between competitors on price, 
output, market division, and bid rigging. These practices are prohibited per se.72 
Relative monopolistic practices are what would be treated under monopoly or 
abuse of dominance provisions in other jurisdictions. Some of these were 
specified in the law, such as resale price maintenance, tied sales, exclusive 
dealing, and refusals to deal, whereas others could be reached by an open-ended 
provision that defined “any conduct that unduly damages, or impairs the 
competitive process and free access to production, processing, distribution and 
marketing of goods and services” as anti-competitive.73 The explicit list of relative 
monopolistic practices has been extended in subsequent reforms of the FLEC as 
a reaction to a Supreme Court decision in 2005 that declared the provision 
unconstitutional for failing to establish the parameters that the FCC must 
observe to sanction the relative monopolistic practices involved.74 
Under the 1992 FLEC, the FCC did not have the power to restructure a 
monopolized industry.75 Similarly, the FLEC did not address monopolistic 
pricing.76 Regulators could have used sector-specific regulations to control 
abusive pricing practices by dominant firms, but the FCC first had to identify the 
firm as having market power in a sector before the regulator could step in to 
address the conduct in question. 
The FLEC prohibits any merger whose objective or effect is to reduce, distort, 
or hinder competition.77 All mergers that go beyond a certain threshold in terms 
of sales or assets require notification to the FCC/COFECE.78 In assessing 
mergers, the FLEC requires the FCC/COFECE to consider whether the merging 
 
 70.  Castañeda Gallardo, supra note 40, at 346.  
 71. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law], Diario Oficial de 
la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.). 
 72.  Id. at arts. 8, 9. 
 73.  Id. at art. 10, pfo. 7. 
 74.  Eduardo Pérez Motta & Heidi Sada Correa, Competition Policy in Mexico, in BUILDING NEW 
COMPETITION LAW REGIMES 3, 11 (David Lewis ed., 2013); Ana Elena Fierro & Adriana Garcia, Guía 
de las decisiones del PJF en materia de competencia económica: Cómo generar una cultura de competencia 
17 (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica, Documentos de Trabajo 31, 2008).  
 75.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 12.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 16, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).  
 78.  Id. at art. 20.  
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parties would be able to fix prices unilaterally, substantially restrict competitors’ 
access to the market, or engage in unlawful monopolistic conduct.79 The 
FCC/COFECE must identify the relevant market and determine market power 
to analyze the mergers.80 
The FLEC recognizes the possibility that the state itself or state-owned 
enterprises can commit anti-competitive actions. State-owned enterprises are 
subject to the FLEC’s provisions on relative and absolute monopolistic practices, 
except in areas of “strategic concern” as defined by Article 28 of the Mexican 
Constitution.81 Other than these exceptions, the FLEC applies to all economic 
actors, public or private. The FLEC empowers the FCC to give its opinion—
which until the 2006 reforms was non-binding—on the effects that existing 
legislation, regulations, and administrative acts of state organs may have on 
competition.82 Upon request by the Federal Executive, the FCC may also give its 
opinion on the effects of competition on new laws and regulations proposed to 
the Congress.83 The FCC/COFECE participate in inter-ministerial committees in 
order to inject competition policy principles into regulatory decisions, and 
therefore have been involved in policymaking about privatization, licensing, 
standards, sector regulation, and foreign trade.84 
The FLEC empowered the FCC, which became operational in 1993, to 
enforce its provisions.85 The FCC was attached in budgetary terms to the 
Secretary of Commerce and Industrial Development,86 but otherwise was 
technically and administratively independent.87 Moreover, the Secretary could 
not intervene in the decisions of the FCC, unlike sector regulators such as the 
Federal Commission for Telecommunications (COFETEL) whose decisions had 
to be approved by the Ministry of Telecommunications and Transport.88 The 
decisionmaking body in the FCC was a plenum of five commissioners appointed 
by the President for staggered ten-year terms, which made decisions by a majority 
 
 79.  Id. at art. 17.  
 80.  Id. at art. 18.  
 81.  Article 28 of the Mexican Constitution lists the following as sectors of strategic concern: the 
postal system, telegraphs, and radiotelegraphy; radioactive minerals and generation of nuclear energy; 
the planning and control of the national electric system, as well as the public service of transmission and 
distribution of electric energy; and the exploration and extraction of oil and other hydrocarbons. 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Méxicanos, CP, art. 28, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO] 
03-2-1983 (Mex.), últimas reformas DOF 20-12-2013 (Mex.).  
 82.  Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 24, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 25. 
 85. Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] arts. 23, 24, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).  
 86.  OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 36. 
 87.  Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] art. 23, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).  
 88.  Roger G. Noll, Priorities for Telecommunications Reform in Mexico, in NO GROWTH WITHOUT 
EQUITY? INEQUALITY, INTERESTS AND COMPETITION IN MEXICO 365, 380 (Santiago Levy & Michael 
Walton eds., 2009). 
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vote.89 The general impression is that the FCC was for the most part able to 
protect its independence from the Executive and other state agencies even before 
the 2013 constitutional amendments that reconstituted it as an independent 
agency.90 It was also able to remain relatively free from the influence of big 
business compared to sector regulators such as the COFETEL.91 
V 
IMPEDIMENTS TO EFFECTIVE ENFORCEMENT IN THE INITIAL YEARS       
(1993–2006) 
The framing article of this symposium describes how various conditions in 
developing countries may prevent competition agencies in those countries from 
effectively implementing competition laws and engaging in competition 
advocacy.92 Some of those conditions have been less of an issue in Mexico than 
in poorer countries. For instance, recruiting staff with technical expertise has 
mostly not been a significant obstacle,93 except in some areas such as mergers that 
require complex economic analysis.94 Budgetary resources were a more serious 
concern in the initial years, especially after the tightening of government 
spending due to the financial crisis—the agency budget fell about thirty percent 
in real terms between 1994 and 1997.95 Concerns with the budget continued into 
the mid-2000s.96 An inadequate budget can be an important obstacle to the 
effectiveness of any agency, but a generous budget allocation is not a sufficient 
condition for agency success. In fact, there is evidence that in its initial years the 
FCC punched below its weight in terms of efficiency for the level of budgetary 
resources it had.97 The following factors have impeded the effectiveness of the 
Mexican competition regime. 
A. Legislation 
Some obstacles to the effectiveness of competition policy in the early years 
were due to the provisions of the FLEC itself and the powers it granted to the 
FCC. The FLEC did not allow the FCC to restructure monopolies. It quickly 
became clear, however, that lacking the power to address structural monopolies 
could be problematic in a country like Mexico with a highly concentrated 
 
 89.  Ley Federal de Competencia Económica [LFCE] [Federal Competition Law] arts. 25, 26, Diario 
Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 24-12-1992 (Mex.).  
 90.  GCR 2002, supra note 26, at 34; OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 18.  
 91.  Isabel Guerrero, Luis F. López-Calva & Michael Walton, The Inequality Trap and Its Links to 
Low Growth in Mexico, in NO GROWTH WITHOUT EQUITY? INEQUALITY, INTERESTS AND 
COMPETITION IN MEXICO, supra note 88, at 111, 126, 153. 
 92.  Aydin & Büthe, supra note 19, at 15–26.  
 93.  COMISIÓN FEDERAL DE COMPETENCIA, INFORME DE COMPETENCIA ECONÓMICA 2003, 20 
(2003); OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 53–54.  
 94.  OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 54. 
 95.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 21. 
 96.  OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 64–65.  
 97.  Dalkir, supra note 24, at 239–40. 
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economic structure. Moreover, early privatization programs did not have the 
intended effect of breaking up structural monopolies; they sometimes merely 
transformed a public monopoly into a private one,98 the notable example being 
the telecommunications giant Télefonos de México (Telmex). The public 
monopoly Telmex was sold as a package to a single investor, rather than being 
broken up, in order to maximize state revenues.99 Furthermore, the government 
offered significant tax reductions and an effective monopoly for five years after 
the privatization to sweeten the deal.100 Neither the FCC nor the sector regulator 
had been established at the time of the privatization of Telmex, and once 
established they had few powers to deal with it. 
The division of responsibilities between sector regulators and the FCC in 
terms of dealing with relative monopolistic practices in regulated sectors also 
proved problematic. Under the FLEC, the FCC was responsible for identifying 
whether a firm had market power in a sector, but it was the sector regulator that 
had the responsibility to address this behavior, without the FCC’s participation 
in the negotiations or the preparation of regulations to deal with the anti-
competitive conduct.101 This division of responsibilities became problematic if the 
FCC found the firm to have significant market power, but the sector regulator 
was too weak or had been captured by the actors whose behavior it was supposed 
to regulate.102 
The investigative powers granted to the FCC were also widely perceived to 
be inadequate.103 The FCC did not have the power to conduct dawn raids—
unannounced searches in company headquarters to gather information and 
evidence—before 2011, a power which would have improved its chances of 
collecting meaningful evidence in cartel cases. Nor could the FCC initially count 
on a leniency program to help its efforts to combat cartels. Moreover, the fines it 
could impose—and effectively collect—were not adequate to deter firms from 
engaging in anti-competitive conduct.104 Prior to the 2011 reforms, The Economist 
commented that it was profitable for firms to cheat even if caught.105 
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 100.  See id. at 323–25 (noting that “[t]he government’s actions and omissions turned [Telmex] into 
an extremely profitable quasi-monopoly and its owners into economically powerful people virtually 
overnight.”).  
 101.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 32; OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 34.  
 102.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 32. 
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B. The Judicial System 
In addition to the provisions of the FLEC itself, significant obstacles to the 
effective implementation of the competition law arose from various aspects of 
the judicial system in Mexico. Under the 1992 FLEC, the parties to a competition 
case had ample opportunity for judicial review if they were dissatisfied with the 
FCC’s decisions.106 The first of these is the “amparo”—injunction—action, 
established in Articles 103 to 107 of the Mexican Constitution.107 An amparo can 
be claimed by anyone in the federal district courts on the grounds that he is being 
subjected to an unconstitutional statute or that his due process rights are being 
infringed.108 Firms could claim amparos challenging the FCC’s investigation, its 
procedures, or its final decisions.109 If the courts decided an interlocutory 
procedural amparo in favor of a firm, the FCC typically commenced a new 
proceeding, against which the firm could file a new amparo.110 If a final FCC 
decision was at issue, parties could request, and frequently obtained, a motion to 
stay until the amparo review was complete.111 Amparo decisions could be 
appealed to higher courts, and if the amparo request addressed the 
constitutionality of a provision of the FLEC, then the appeal went straight to the 
Supreme Court.112 While the FCC generally won in the Supreme Court with 
respect to the constitutionality of its actions and of the law itself (with some 
exceptions), the district courts were liberal in granting amparos.113 
Designed to protect individuals’ due process rights, amparo claims came to 
be used aggressively and in increasing numbers by private actors against the FCC, 
which complicated competition law enforcement in various ways. They delayed 
the FCC’s proceedings, because firms frequently filed multiple claims in different 
districts or filed subsequent amparos throughout the proceedings.114 For instance, 
after the FCC declared Telmex a dominant carrier in 1998—a necessary step for 
the sector regulator COFETEL to step in and impose remedies—its decision was 
stayed by a series of amparos, changes to its declaration, and further amparos, 
until finally a court annulled the FCC’s decision in 2006 because the evidentiary 
basis was outdated.115 Dealing with the amparos filed against it imposed 
significant strains on the agency’s resources. According to the FCC, until 2003, 
one out of eight of its investigations was subject to an amparo, and more than half 
of the merger investigations were subject to amparos.116 The OECD reported in 
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2004 that the lawyers in the Legal Affairs Directorate of the FCC devoted forty 
percent of their time to dealing with amparo cases.117 
In addition to amparos, if an FCC decision imposed a fine, a company could 
seek judicial relief through an appeal to the Federal Court of Fiscal and 
Administrative Justice (Tribunal Federal de Justicia Fiscal y Administrativa). 
This court normally reviews tax cases, but it asserts jurisdiction to review any 
agency action that involves the imposition of a monetary payment obligation on 
a private party, and thus has reviewed a growing number of cases in which the 
FCC imposed fines.118 The FCC lost a number of these cases on the grounds that 
its orders imposing fines were not adequately justified.119 
Even if an FCC decision imposing fines was confirmed after amparos and at 
the Federal Court of Fiscal and Administrative Justice, collection still proved 
difficult. Until the 2006 reforms, the fines imposed by the FCC were collected by 
the treasuries of municipal authorities, but this system was ineffective because 
the municipalities had few incentives to collect.120 Due to judicial and procedural 
intricacies, the FCC was able to collect only 9.5 percent of all the fines it imposed 
between 1997 through 2002, with 18.5 percent revoked or lost on judicial review, 
and seventy-two percent remaining uncollected.121 The inability to collect fines, 
or collection after years of delay while fines were decimated by inflation, 
significantly reduced the deterrent effect of FCC’s decisions. 
In addition to the judicial review procedures that became powerful tools in 
the hands of companies to prevent or delay enforcement, some broader concerns 
about the functioning of the Mexican judicial system impeded successful 
competition law enforcement in its first decade. The unfamiliarity of the district 
courts with substantive antitrust issues was one of them. In its early years, the 
FCC saw many of its decisions reversed at the district courts, mostly on 
procedural grounds.122 In addition to being unfamiliar with competition policy 
issues, judges were inexperienced in applying a statute as short and non-specific 
as the FLEC, because the civil law model in Mexico has historically involved 
detailed legislation.123 Thus, by ruling adversely against the FCC on procedural 
grounds, “the court can send the case back to the [FCC] and avoids resolving the 
antitrust question.”124 Judges’ lack of specialized knowledge in antitrust has been 
a problem in many developing countries with young competition regimes,125 and 
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establishing specialized courts—like Mexico did in 2013—can be a way to 
alleviate this problem.126 
Questions have also been raised about the capacity of Mexico’s judicial 
system to resist outside pressures, such as those coming from big business.127 An 
empirical analysis of amparos requested in competition cases reveals that 
companies directly or indirectly controlled by billionaires were more likely to 
secure an amparo from courts compared to other firms.128 These results support 
the claim that concentrated business interests have undue influence in the 
Mexican judicial system. This does not necessarily mean that the judicial system 
is corrupt—though it may be—as big business also commands significant 
resources to hire the best law firms to defend itself. The OECD has stated, 
“[t]here is some belief in the private sector that the Commission is simply 
outgunned in amparo cases and cannot match the legal resources arrayed against 
it.”129 The FCC’s annual budget was equal to two days’ worth of profits by Telmex 
and RadioMóvil Dipsa or Telcel,130 the two big companies that dominate the 
landline and cellular phone markets in Mexico, both controlled by Carlos Slim.131 
Proceedings delayed by series of amparos, decisions frequently overturned by 
district courts, and failure to impose or collect fines not only diluted the impact 
of the FCC’s enforcement efforts, but may have also weakened the image of the 
FCC in the eyes of the Mexican public. The OECD observed in 1998 that the 
FCC had started acting cautiously as a reaction to the aggressive court cases filed 
by private actors, and that this had led to a perception that the FCC was weak.132 
C. Weak Competition Culture 
Another one of the key impediments to the effectiveness of competition 
policy in Mexico—and in other developing countries—is the lack of genuine 
support for competition policy among companies, state organs, and the public, or 
more broadly the lack of a competition culture.133 Lack of awareness of and 
support for competition law lowers compliance by economic actors, and thus 
detracts from efforts to establish an effective competition policy. It is more costly 
to elicit compliance with a law for which public acceptance is low. Awareness of 
and support for the law could trigger more and better complaints about anti-
competitive conduct, less tolerance for abuses of the law, and overall greater 
political support or pressure for its enforcement. For these reasons, some experts 
 
 126.  ELEANOR FOX & DANIEL CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW 
423–24 (2010).  
 127.  Guerrero, López-Calva & Walton, supra note 91, at 126–27. 
 128.  Id. at 129. 
 129.  OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 54.  
 130.  del Villar, supra note 99, at 334.  
 131.  Dolia Estevez, Mexico Cracks Down On Billionaires Carlos Slim’s And Emilio Azcarraga’s 
Telecom Monopolies, FORBES (Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/doliaestevez/2013/12/09 
/mexicos-two-telecom-giants-under-threat-of-being-declared-monopolies/#643f391642a4.  
 132.  OECD 1998, supra note 3, at 30.  
 133.  Velázquez Roa, supra note 41, at 108.  
AYDIN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2016  1:47 PM 
172 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 155 
suggest an emphasis on educating the public and state actors about competition 
policy rather than traditional competition enforcement in developing country 
contexts.134 
In Mexico, in the initial years after the adoption of the competition law, many 
private, state, and municipal actors continued to operate according to the pre-
reform formal and informal rules of the game.135 For example, the National Road 
Transport Chamber continued to set minimum prices in transport,136 and 
municipal authorities sanctioned market-sharing agreements among tortilla 
producers in the municipality of Carillo Puerto.137 They may have done so not 
only because they benefited from the existing system, but perhaps also because 
they did not know enough about competition law or had not internalized it. 
Similarly, the broader public was unaware of the law and its potential benefits; it 
was not generally supportive of the idea of competition as an organizing principle 
of the economy even after ten years of competition enforcement.138 Few among 
the public knew much about the FCC and what it did: a survey commissioned by 
the FCC in 2009 showed that only one percent of Mexicans knew which state 
authority promoted competition among firms.139 Moreover, the competition law 
was perceived as being a product of the Salinas presidency, or a requirement 
imposed by NAFTA, which further reduced the support for the law and the FCC 
in the early years.140 
Notwithstanding these impediments to effective enforcement, the FCC also 
had some early successes that helped raise its profile among the economic actors 
and the public at large, which contributed to its later success. The FCC’s 
challenges to state-sanctioned anti-competitive barriers “provided immense 
publicity and quantifiable results for the agency”; for instance, when it sided with 
the foreign competitors’ interests in penetrating the Mexican long-distance 
telecommunications market, or when it challenged Pemex, the national oil 
company, on its control of service station concessions.141 Moreover, the FCC’s 
investigations in the initial years focused on sectors such as milk, tortillas, soft 
drinks, credit cards, and transport services, with a tangible and potentially large 
impact on consumers, though it was not always successful in these efforts.142 
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VI 
REFORMS TO THE MEXICAN COMPETITION REGIME 
Reforms to the competition law in 2006 and 2011, constitutional amendments 
in 2013, as well as the competition law that replaced the FLEC in 2014 all 
addressed some of the problems that impeded the effectiveness of the Mexican 
competition regime. 
A. Legislative Changes 
The loopholes or weaknesses in the FLEC were addressed through a number 
of reforms starting in 2006. With respect to abuses of dominance, the 2006 reform 
allowed the FCC to impose structural remedies such as divestitures in monopoly 
cases,143 and expanded the list of relative monopolistic conditions listed in the 
Article 10 of the 1992 FLEC.144 These changes allow the FCC/COFECE to better 
deal with abuses of dominance. 
The 2006 and 2011 reforms considerably strengthened the FCC’s investigative 
powers, especially against cartels. The 2006 reform introduced a leniency 
program, which reduced penalties for firms that provided evidence in cartel cases, 
in the hopes of increasing the likelihood that cartel members would cooperate 
with the authorities.145 The 2011 reform gave the FCC the power to conduct dawn 
raids, which are particularly useful tools for collecting evidence in cartel cases.146 
Before the 2011 reform, the FCC could visit companies to gather evidence, but 
these visits had to be announced beforehand, which gave the investigated firms 
the opportunity to hide or destroy evidence. The FCC’s fight against cartels was 
further reinforced by expanding the scope for criminal prosecution against 
individuals in cartel cases. The reforms also strengthened the FCC’s deterrent 
power by increasing maximum fines from $7 million to ten percent of the firm’s 
annual revenues in Mexico. The 2006 reform made the federal tax authorities, 
rather than municipal authorities, responsible for collecting the fines imposed by 
the FCC, and the collected fines are used for a program to promote small and 
medium sized enterprises.147 This was expected to increase the efficiency of 
collection of the fines, though problems still remain on this front.148 
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The 2011 reform granted the FCC the power to settle with parties while the 
investigation is ongoing, whereas before it could only come to a settlement after 
it concluded its investigation.149 This allows the FCC/COFECE more flexibility 
in settling cases, and helps avoid lengthy investigations and potential court 
proceedings. The FCC was also granted the power to issue interim measures, by 
which it can oblige firms to cease alleged anti-competitive conduct while an 
investigation is carried out.150 Finally, class actions for damages in competition 
cases were allowed.151 President Calderón’s initial reform proposal also included 
political autonomy for the FCC and even higher fines, but these provisions were 
eliminated or watered down in the congressional committees.152 
The competition regime in Mexico saw its most fundamental reforms in 2013 
and 2014. Constitutional amendments in 2013 changed the legal status of the 
FCC, reconstituting it as a legally independent entity under the Mexican 
Constitution.153 The amendments increased the number of commissioners in the 
plenum from five to seven, and made their selection process more transparent 
and independent of the Executive.154 They created an evaluation committee that 
is responsible for presenting the candidates, who then must be approved by the 
Senate.155 The 2013 amendments also created IFETEL to replace the 
telecommunications sector regulator COFETEL, along with reforms that 
removed the limits on foreign ownership in telecommunications.156 IFETEL is 
constitutionally independent, like the COFECE, and is responsible for 
competition matters in telecommunications and broadcasting.157 The 
commissioners of IFETEL are selected by the same method as the COFECE 
commissioners.158 The new FLEC adopted in 2014 creates an investigation unit 
within the COFECE in order to separate investigative authority from 
decisionmaking authority, a change that had been demanded by practitioners for 
 
 149.  OECD 2011, supra note 146, at 4.  
 150.  Id.  
 151.  Decreto por el que se reforman y adicionan el Co digo Federal de Procedimientos Civiles, el 
Co digo Civil Federal, la Ley Federal de Competencia Econo mica, la Ley Federal de Proteccio n al 
Consumidor, la Ley Orga nica del Poder Judicial de la Federacio n, la Ley General del Equilibrio 
Ecolo gico y la Proteccio n al Ambiente y la Ley de Proteccio n y Defensa al Usuario de Servicios 
Financieros, arts. 578–625, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF] 30-8-2011 (Mex.).  
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some time.159 This separation increases the procedural fairness of competition 
proceedings. 
Legislative reforms have been coupled with greater political backing for the 
COFECE, which is evidenced by increases in its budget and staff numbers. It has 
enjoyed a boost to its budget of thirty-two percent for 2014 and sixty percent for 
2015.160 It has also grown impressively in terms of staff numbers compared to a 
decade earlier: In September 2015, its personnel totalled 359, more than double 
the staff number than in September 2003, addressing the issue of understaffing 
that had been a problem in the earlier years.161 
B. The Judiciary 
The 2013 reform established specialized courts to oversee appeals of 
COFECE and IFETEL decisions; that is, competition law, telecommunications, 
and broadcasting decisions.162 The amparo requests in these areas are also 
resolved by these specialized courts. These developments mean that appeals and 
amparos in competition cases are now considered by judges specialized and 
experienced in competition matters, and also that judicial proceedings may take 
less time to conclude due to their separation from the rest of the judicial system 
and delay in the dockets, both of which have the potential to ameliorate some of 
the earlier problems. Another important change is that COFECE resolutions are 
not subject to a judicial stay pending the outcome of litigation.163 
In addition to the legislative changes that addressed some of the problems 
arising from amparos, judicial inexperience, and backlog, both the FCC and the 
judiciary have experienced a learning process that has led to significant 
improvements in the relationship between the two. The FCC learned from its 
procedural mistakes of earlier years, began to hire more lawyers, and improved 
its legal reasoning.164 The judiciary participated in a training program jointly 
organized by the Federal Trade Commission and the Institute of the Federal 
Judiciary (Instituto de Judicatura Federal), in which U.S. judges experienced in 
antitrust matters held workshops to train Mexican judges.165 
The legislative changes and the training programs have borne fruit: the FCC 
and COFECE have gradually improved their success rate at the courts, and 
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boasted a success rate of eighty one percent in 2013166 and ninety one percent in 
2014,167 compared with about twenty five percent earlier in the 2000s.168 As a 
former FCC official highlighted with respect to the FCC’s earlier dismal success 
rate, improvements in the FCC/COFECE’s record in court is important not only 
in strengthening enforcement efforts by making decisions that stick rather than 
get overturned, but also in improving their credibility in the eyes of companies 
who might be more willing to bring complaints.169 
C. Competition Culture 
The FCC/COFECE improved their efforts to foster a competition culture in 
Mexico as a result of a gradual learning process rather than legislative reforms. 
The OECD’s evaluation in 1998 and 2004 pointed to the lack of competition 
culture as an important impediment to the effective enforcement of competition 
law, and recommended that the FCC increase its advocacy efforts vis-à-vis the 
public.170 The FCC and later the COFECE responded to these recommendations 
by increasing their efforts to foster knowledge of and public support for the 
competition law. They have established dialogues with the legal community and 
business associations, developed a program aimed at small and medium-sized 
businesses to increase awareness of competition law, and become more active in 
promoting their work through public meetings and seminars.171 Realizing the 
weakness of teaching and research on competition law, and economic laws in 
general in Mexico,172 the FCC/COFECE have established alliances with 
prestigious academic institutions such as Center for Research and Teaching in 
Economics (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica) to offer a diploma 
in “Economic Competition.”173 Also, the Commissioners and other public 
officials from COFECE participate in teaching a course on competition in the 
economics department of Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, in 
addition to giving seminars at various other universities.174 
One of the central axes of the FCC’s and the COFECE’s communications 
with the public has been framing competition policy issues in terms of their effects 
on consumers. In 2008, for example, the FCC published a commissioned report—
frequently cited not only in its communications with the public, but also by 
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politicians and international organizations such as the OECD and the World 
Bank—that quantified the impact of anti-competitive practices on consumers in 
Mexico.175 
Some influential cartel and abuse of dominance cases have also been 
important in demonstrating how the FCC’s and COFECE’s work benefits 
consumers. In 2012, the FCC busted cartels involving tortillas (both at the 
municipal and national levels), eggs, and poultry, all key products for Mexican 
consumers, which put the FCC in the spotlight.176 Another headline-grabbing 
decision involved abuse of dominance by Telcel, the dominant mobile carrier 
owned by Carlos Slim, which was fined a record of $1 billion in 2011.177 The FCC 
reversed this fine in 2012 upon commitments by the company to reduce its mobile 
termination rates.178 While the decision to reverse the fine was seen as a setback 
by some,179 the deal was expected to generate  $6 billion a year in savings for 
consumers.180 The FCC made sure that these benefits were communicated to 
consumers.181 
International observers have praised the recent reforms for modernizing and 
bringing Mexican competition law and policy to international standards. 
Nonetheless, some aspects of the reform—such as the new FLEC prohibition of 
“barriers to competition,” or the power it granted to COFECE to regulate 
“essential inputs”—were criticized for departing from international best 
practices.182 Additionally, a number of practical issues in competition 
enforcement arose in the aftermath of the reforms. The COFECE saw some 
significant staff turnover. In the first year after the reforms, seven new 
commissioners replaced the previous commission of five, and almost forty 
percent of competition enforcers left, with a significant number moving to the 
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newly established IFETEL.183 Another twenty-four percent left in 2014.184 The 
COFECE was able to replace its staff; nonetheless, training the newly recruited 
personnel has consumed the agency’s resources and left the agency with a rather 
inexperienced enforcement team.185 This staff turnover and efforts at institution 
building resulted in modest enforcement in 2014, and a slowing down of 
investigations during this time of transition.186 
VII 
EXPLAINING THE RELATIVE SUCCESS OF THE MEXICAN COMPETITION 
REGIME 
Given the various impediments to the effective implementation of the 
Mexican competition regime in the early years, the gradual strengthening of 
Mexican competition law and policy, and the FCC and COFECE, is impressive. 
The interplay of domestic and international factors has enabled the adoption 
of a series of legislative and constitutional reforms starting in 2006, and also 
motivated a series of internal improvements in the FCC. On the domestic front, 
the pressure for legislative changes and internal reforms came from three sets of 
actors: (1) consumers and consumer organizations; (2) think tanks, business 
associations, and the bar association; and (3) domestic firms trying to break into 
traditionally concentrated markets. Internationally, foreign firms trying to break 
into the Mexican market and international organizations influenced the reform 
process. 
A. Domestic Factors 
1. Consumers and Consumer Organizations 
Consumers’ interest in more effective competition policy arises from its 
potential to lower prices. The high costs of services provided by dominant firms 
operating in network industries—such as telecommunications and 
broadcasting—were one of the more visible signs of the concentrated economic 
structure of Mexico.187 Mexican consumers pay more for telephone and 
broadband internet services than consumers in other Latin American countries, 
and the services they receive are of lower quality.188 While the example of 
telecommunications is highly publicized, in reality many more sectors suffer from 
low levels of competition, generating significant costs for consumers. For 
instance, in 2010 the FCC busted a bid-rigging agreement between firms 
providing insulin and other supplies to the healthcare system, which, according 
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to some calculations, cost consumers $46 million between 2003 and 2006.189 
Moreover, welfare losses from overcharging by firms with market power tend to 
affect the poorest Mexican citizens and those in the rural sectors the most 
seriously, contributing to the already high levels of inequality in the country.190 
Former Chairman of the FCC Eduardo Perez Motta, who served from 2004 
through 2013, says that reforms in telecommunications were possible because 
“the Mexican people had become fed up with paying so much in phone 
charges.”191 Such intense interests, however, do not necessarily result in collective 
action that can push for change.192 Consumer interests are diffuse and hard to 
mobilize. Moreover, they are frequently up against well-organized business 
interests that have a stake in “weak and passive” competition policy 
enforcement.193 
Until recently, Mexico has had no national, private-sector consumer 
organization.194 That is changing with the emergence of non-governmental 
organizations focused on consumer issues such as Observatel, a watchdog of 
reforms in the telecommunications sector,195 the consumer organization group Al 
Consumidor A.C.,196 and Contraloría Ciudadana, which monitors public 
policies—including competition—and the fight against corruption.197 These 
organizations push vocally for legislative changes and help keep competition and 
its effects on consumers on the public agenda. Another way in which the 
consumers’ interests are represented is through Mexico’s Office of the Federal 
Prosecutor for the Consumer (PROFECO). In 2005—on the recommendation of 
the OECD’s 2004 Peer Review of Mexico—the FCC entered into an agreement 
with PROFECO to allow for more communication and coordination between the 
agencies.198 PROFECO has been a potential source of information for the FCC 
and the COFECE, as it monitors some sectors such as tortillas for signs of price-
 
 189.  ECONOMIST, supra note 48. 
 190.  Carlos M. Urzúa, Distributive and Regional Effects of Monopoly Power, 22 ECONOMÍA 
MEXICANA 279, 290 (2013). 
 191.  Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and Policy in Africa, Presentation at the Duke University 
Law School Seminar (Apr. 10, 2015). 
 192.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 2 (1965).  
 193.  BEN ROSS SCHNEIDER, HIERARCHICAL CAPITALISM IN LATIN AMERICA: BUSINESS, LABOR, 
AND THE CHALLENGES OF EQUITABLE DEVELOPMENT 152 (2013). 
 194.  OECD 2004, supra note 4, at 71.  
 195.  Elisabeth Malkin, New Rules to Reshape Telecom in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/08/business/international/new-rules-to-reshape-telecom-in-
mexico.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/6YVN-N3B8] (LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. archive only). 
 196.  See, e.g., Crayton Harrison, Mexican Antitrust Regulator Puts Pressure on Billionaires, 
BLOOMBERG (June 12, 2012, 4:27 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-06-12/mexican-
antitrust-regulator-puts-pressure-on-billionaires (describing Al Consumidor’s criticism of the FCC’s 
settlement with America Movil SAB, owned by billionaire Carlos Slim).  
 197.  Observatorio Ciudadano de Competencia Económica, CONTRALORÍA CIUDADANA, 
http://www.contraloriaciudadana.org.mx/respaldo/?p=pj [https://perma.cc/AA6L-CR27] (last visited 
May 22, 2016).  
 198.  OECD 2007, supra note 171, at 34.  
AYDIN (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2016  1:47 PM 
180 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 79: 155 
fixing.199 The FCC opened investigations in the poultry cartel case, for instance, 
based on information provided by PROFECO.200 Moreover, PROFECO has had 
the right to introduce the equivalent of class action suits in competition cases 
since 2011, which could add to the deterrent effect of competition law in Mexico. 
It recently brought two such cases against dominant landline and cellular phone 
companies Telmex and Telcel to attempt to recover money on behalf of millions 
of consumers.201 
Consumers’ roles in strengthening competition law and policy in Mexico have 
been multiple. First, consumer organizations and PROFECO have raised 
awareness about the lack of competition in Mexican markets and its effects on 
consumers, thus contributing to the competition culture in Mexico. They have 
also aided enforcement efforts by being sources of information for the FCC and 
COFECE, as well as putting pressure on these organizations to be transparent 
and accountable. Finally, consumers as voters may have helped elect presidents 
with reform platforms aimed at increasing economic competition since the 
elections in 2000, which for the first time in seventy-one years brought a party 
other than the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Institucional 
Revolucionario) to power.202 President Vicente Fox (2000 through 2006) included 
reforming the telecommunications and electricity industries and increasing the 
autonomy of regulatory agencies in his campaign agenda.203 President Felipe 
Calderón (2006 through 2012) promised to dismantle monopolies and increase 
competition.204 And finally, in 2012, Enrique Peña Nieto’s reform agenda 
resulted, after his election, in the Pact for Mexico (Pacto por México), an 
agreement between the three main parties of Mexico on a broad package of 
reforms, including competition law. It is difficult to know the extent to which 
economic reform issues play a role on voters’ choices in Mexico, but the growing 
publicity around consumers’ concerns has gone hand in hand with the election of 
presidents with reform agendas aimed at increasing competition in Mexican 
markets. 
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2. Think Tanks and Business Associations 
Societal actors such as the influential think tank Mexican Institute for 
Competitiveness (Instituto Mexicano para la Competitividad)—whose projects 
are funded in part by international organizations such as the World Bank, OECD 
and bilateral donors such as the United States, Britain, and Germany—have 
contributed to this debate by emphasizing the importance of competitive 
domestic markets to increase Mexico’s international competitiveness.205 It is 
indicative of the Institute’s influence that its former director, Alejandra Palacios 
Prieto, is now the head of the COFECE. The Research Centre for Development 
(Centro de Investigación para el Desarrollo) has also conducted research on 
competition law and policy206 and offered opinions on reform proposals.207 These 
two think tanks, along with IFETEL, COFECE, the Institute of the Federal 
Judiciary, and the Center for Research and Teaching in Economics now form the 
Alliance for Competition (Alianza por la Competencia), which supports public 
activities and research on competition law and policy, and is supported by 
bilateral donors and international organizations.208 The impact of these 
organizations has been to raise awareness about competition law and policy 
among firms and society, as well as political actors. 
Private sector representatives, such as the Business Coordinating Council 
(Consejo Coordinador Empresarial) have also highlighted the importance of 
economic competition to promote more inclusive and healthier markets and 
called for reforming the FCC to achieve these ends.209 The related Center for 
Economic Studies of the Private Sector (Centro de Estudios Económicos del 
Sector Privado) published a survey of business people in 2005, which pointed to 
public and private monopolies as the most important obstacles in the markets for 
business development.210 Some business interests, such as the Mexican Council 
for Businessmen (Consejo Mexicano de Hombres de Negocios), are also 
represented through their support of think tanks such as the Mexican Institute 
for Competitiveness. 
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Finally, competition law practitioners as well as the Mexican Bar Association 
(Barra Mexicana Colegio de Abogados) have had input in the reform process. 
As frequent users of the system, individual lawyers and the bar association have 
voiced their concerns about the deficiencies and possible biases of the system, 
and questioned its effectiveness.211 The Bar Association also contributes to 
training programs for judges and regulators on competition issues.212 
These domestic actors—with significant international ties through funding 
and joint projects—have played a meaningful role in the reform process in 
multiple ways. First, they help generate a competition culture among firms and 
the public through their research, publications, conferences, seminars, and 
trainings. Second, especially as users of the system, lawyers and the Bar 
Association have been vocal critics of the FCC’s procedures and functioning,213 
and thus have contributed to its internal reform process. Finally, their opinions 
on the reform proposals have been inputs for legislative reforms. 
3. Domestic Firms 
Individual firms that have difficulty entering markets dominated by large 
players have been another source of support for the FCC/COFECE. Such firms 
typically bring complaints to the agency and challenge dominant firms’ anti-
competitive conduct in the courts. For instance, Avantel, a Mexican cellular 
provider,214 sued Telmex nine times for abuse of dominance.215 The same 
company used the Freedom of Information Act to force COFETEL to provide it 
with a copy of the concession title granted to Telmex by the government in 2007, 
thus helping to increase the transparency of the sector regulator.216 As the 
competition regime in Mexico strengthens and judicial uncertainty abates, 
domestic firms will be increasingly motivated to bring complaints about 
competition infringements. This has the potential to reduce the burden on 
COFECE in identifying and sanctioning infringements. 
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B. International Factors 
In interaction with these domestic actors, a number of international actors 
have been sources of pressure or support for the improvement of the Mexican 
competition regime. 
1. Foreign Firms Trying to Access the Mexican Market 
Foreign firms have been a source of pressure on the Mexican government to 
improve the effectiveness of competition law and sector regulations. For instance, 
in 2000 the U.S. government brought a dispute against Mexico in the World 
Trade Organization—principally on behalf of AT&T and MCI217—claiming that 
Mexican telecommunications regulator breached its obligations under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services.218 COFETEL had granted Telmex, as 
the firm with the largest share of the outgoing calls, the power to fix the 
termination rate to be paid by all foreign carriers—for example, AT&T and 
MCI—for calls terminating in Mexico.219 The GATS ruled against Mexico in 
2004, a decision that the Mexican government did not appeal,220 and forced 
COFETEL to change the regulations. This has had a significant downward 
impact on international settlement rates—they fell from approximately $0.40 per 
minute in 1997 to approximately $0.02 in 2007 in areas open to long distance 
competition—and on the price of international calls.221 Mexico’s greater 
economic openness, and its bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements 
mean that foreign firms will increasingly seek access to domestic markets and 
generate pressure for better enforcement of competition laws. As a result of 
recent reforms allowing for greater foreign ownership in telecommunications 
companies, AT&T acquired the third and fourth large players in the mobile 
phone market in Mexico, generating pressures for better services and lower 
prices.222 
2. International Organizations and Regulatory Networks 
The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Economic 
Forum have long emphasized the lack of competition as a significant impediment 
to the growth of the Mexican economy.223 The recommendations of these 
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organizations are frequently reported in the national media and become part of 
the public debate, and have thus been important inputs for reform.224 For 
instance, presenting his proposal for reform of the competition law in 2010 
(eventually passed in 2011), President Felipe Calderón explained that the 
proposal was meant to address lack of competition in the Mexican economy, 
which he saw as an impediment to investment, growth, and efforts to address 
inequality and poverty, citing an OECD report on the impact of uncompetitive 
markets on vulnerable sections of the society.225 In the process leading to the 
adoption of the reforms, Pérez Motta, the chairman of the FCC at the time, 
similarly cited the country’s ranking in the World Economic Forum’s annual 
competitiveness index—number sixty that year—to draw attention to the lack of 
competition in the Mexican economy.226 
Organizations such as the OECD and the ICN have had an even more direct 
impact on the reform process in Mexico.227 The OECD Competition Division 
worked closely with the FCC. Many of the recommendations of the 1998 OECD 
Report on Regulatory Reform in Mexico228 and the 2004 Peer Review of Mexican 
competition law and policy229 found their way into the legislative reform 
proposals. These documents were also crucially important in the FCC’s efforts to 
convince the legislators of the need for reform in competition law in 2006. The 
FCC commented in its submission to the OECD that 
The OECD’s peer review provided a neutral voice to the discussion by presenting a 
non-partisan analysis of the state of competition policy in Mexico and simply outlining 
best practices based on its experience in the area with OECD member countries. The 
Report was used and cited in communications with the legislature and federal public 
administration.230 
The OECD also provided lengthy comments on the draft of the reforms, and 
a letter summarizing OECD’s opinion on the reforms written by the head of the 
OECD Competition Division was shared with the Mexican legislators in the 
process leading up to the adoption of the reforms. The 2011 reform likewise drew 
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significantly on OECD peer review and follow-ups.231 
Finally, the ICN, a virtual network of competition agencies established in 
2001,232 has been an important source of expertise and influence on the Mexican 
competition regime. The ICN was launched with the aim of contributing to 
cooperation and convergence among national competition regimes. Mexico is an 
active participant in the ICN. It led the Agency Effectiveness Working Group of 
the ICN for some years,233 and Pérez Motta acted as the chairman of the ICN 
from 2012 to 2013.234 Interactions among competition agency officials in the ICN, 
who are relatively isolated from political pressures and are focused exclusively 
on competition law, help foster socialization and mutual learning among the 
participants.235 This has been an important promoter of internal reforms of the 
FCC/COFECE.236 
To summarize, international actors have been influential in strengthening the 
Mexican competition regime in multiple ways. Foreign firms seeking access to 
domestic markets have forced the Mexican government to change regulations 
that impede competition as in the area of telecommunications, and increasingly 
their presence in Mexican markets will signify greater competition. International 
organizations and transnational networks such as the OECD and the ICN have 
motivated many of the internal reforms at the FCC, and have been influential as 
neutral external actors in the domestic debates as well as in FCC’s negotiations 
with the legislature. 
These international pressures facilitated reforms by strengthening the hand 
of competition policy reformers in Mexico, though their impact was in no way 
guaranteed. Despite all the support of the OECD, the 2006 reform took nine 
months of analysis and negotiations between the FCC and the legislature.237 The 
2011 reform took a year to pass the Congress.238 In communicating and 
negotiating closely with the lawmakers, the FCC comprehended the importance 
of political maneuvering and negotiations,239 and excelled at this under the 
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chairmanship of Pérez Motta.240 Thus although a competition agency’s 
independence from the executive branch is of utmost importance in the 
effectiveness of competition policy, Mexico’s experience demonstrates that the 
agency also has to be able to maneuver through the political process and have 
sufficient political backing to carry out its mandate—that is, it must have 
“embedded autonomy.”241 
VIII 
CONCLUSION 
The Mexican competition regime is hailed as one of the success stories among 
emerging economies today, but it was not always so. In the first fifteen years after 
its establishment, the FCC ran into many problems in its enforcement of 
competition law, such as insufficient financial resources, legislative loopholes, 
delays and defeats at the district courts, and a lack of support for competition law 
and policy among the general public and economic actors. 
A series of reforms, starting in 2006 and culminating in a fundamental revamp 
of the law and the FCC in 2013 through 2014, have addressed many of these 
problems, and placed the FCC and COFECE among well-respected competition 
authorities in the world. The reforms were possible thanks to a combination of 
domestic and international factors that reinforced one another. Domestically, a 
constituency for stronger competition policy arose, which include consumer 
associations, think tanks, and firms that have been kept out of markets by 
dominant firms. And external pressures aided and reinforced these domestic 
actors. Foreign firms seeking access to the Mexican markets used bilateral and 
international trade agreements to which Mexico was a party in order to push the 
Mexican government to end anti-competitive practices. International 
organizations and transnational networks also gently pressured and guided the 
Mexican policymakers with their expert evaluations, and helped move the 
domestic debate towards concrete legislative action, both directly and indirectly 
through their support for think tanks and nongovernmental organizations in 
Mexico. 
Some broader conclusions can be drawn from the Mexican experience for 
countries with recently adopted competition laws. Most importantly, 
international pressures—in the form of financial and technical assistance, and 
conditionality—alone will not lead to effective enforcement of competition laws 
in developing countries. Domestic ownership of the law by companies, consumer 
organizations, think tanks, and business associations is needed to raise awareness 
of competition law, and to assist in competition agencies’ enforcement efforts. 
International support in the form of expert opinions, reports, and technical 
assistance will be much more effective in promoting reforms if it can rely on the 
existence of a domestic constituency in favor of competition law and policy. 
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